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THE PEOPLE AS SUPREME COURT: SOME
INCOMPLETE NOTES ON SAGER
Akhil Reed Amar*
Professor Sager's characteristically rich and deep paper' reminds us
of the possible existence of, and reasons for, "gaps" of a certain sort-
gaps between judicial doctrine and the constitutional norms underlying
them; gaps between the self-executing (that is, judicially executed) core of
section one of the Thirteenth Amendment and the outer reaches of con-
stitutionally permissible (and even preferred) legislation under section
two; and, possibly, gaps between the Constitution itself and more general
principles of political justice. (He embraces and explicates the first two
sets of gaps, but expresses great skepticism about the third set.)
Given this sharp focus on gaps, I should begin by noting that my
Comment here is likewise marked by gaps. As with the gaps Professor
Sager discusses, the gaps in my Comment are not random; they exhibit a
structure. And just as Professor Sager offers a functional account of, for
example, the gaps between judicial doctrine and constitutional norms, so
shall I now functionally defend the gaps in my Comment: In an effort to
stimulate debate and discussion, I shall spend more time discussing those
parts of Professor Sager's analysis that do not yet fully persuade me, and
less time rehearsing the many areas of common ground.
Make no mistake: the zone of agreement is large and important. I
especially commend Professor Sager's pointed emphasis on, and subtle
analysis of, issues of minimal entitlements-what I sometimes like to call
"40 Acres and a Mule" 2 -and questions raised by sections one and two
of the Thirteenth Amendment. And more generally, I agree that: (1)
there are indeed important aspects of constitutional law that are under-
enforced by judge-fashioned doctrine; (2) there are often good reasons for
these gaps; and (3) in his current paper and in earlier work, 3 Professor
Sager has powerfully explicated many of these reasons.
But having agreed with Professor Sager-and thus (on this point)
* Southmayd Professor, Yale Law School.
1 Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of Constitutional
Law, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 410 (1993).
2 See, eg., Akhil Reed Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A Republican Theory of Minimal Enti-
tlements, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 37 (1990).
3 See, eg., Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
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with James Bradley Thayer before him4 -that gaps do and should exist
between case law and the Constitution, I must confess I am less clear
whether gaps do not and may not legitimately exist between the Consti-
tution and perfect political justice. Maybe that makes me a positivist-
but I need to hear more from Professor Sager than he has offered at this
point.
Sager offers three basic reasons for preferring his "pragmatic-justice
account" of the Constitution to a "positive account." 5 First, he claims
that the "abstract liberty-bearing provisions of the Constitution" are just
too open-ended to provide much interpretive constraint.6 As one who
has spent a considerable amount of time and energy examining the Due
Process Clauses, the Ninth Amendment, and the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause, I find this first point somewhat overstated. 7 To be sure, faith-
ful interpretation here requires judgment and wisdom, and meaning is
determinate only within a zone, leaving considerable discretion to the
interpreter; but these provisions are not mere inkblots so long as we are
willing to bring to bear on them standard interpretive tools of textual,
historical, and structural analysis. (I do, however, agree with Professor
Sager that the best interpretation of many key constitutional provi-
sions-such as the Thirteenth Amendment-does indeed conduce to-
ward justice, but this happy fact seems to me a contingent one. Many of
these justice-conducing provisions, for example, could in theory be
amended out of the Constitution.)
Second, Professor Sager points to the "obduracy of the Constitution
to amendment" which defeats its "majoritarian bona fides."'8 But if, as I
believe, We the People have retained-under the Ninth Amendment, and
elsewhere-a majoritarian right to amend our Constitution outside Arti-
cle V, then this second objection may dissolve.9 (In earlier work, Profes-
sor Sager has been kind enough to note my argument in passing; 10 but
neither he nor anyone else has squarely rebutted my analysis, or shown
me where I went wrong.)
Third, and most importantly, Professor Sager reminds us that
certain critical issues do not depend on "the distribution of popular pref-
4 James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7
HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). Lest my invocation be construed as acquiescence, let me say that I find
many other aspects of Thayer's classic article less than compelling.
5 Sager, supra note 1, at 415.
6 Id. at 416.
7 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991)
[hereinafter Amar, Bill of Rights 1]; Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193 (1992) [hereinafter Amar, Bill of Rights II].
8 Sager, supra note 1, at 416.
9 See Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V,
55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043 (1988).
10 Lawrence G. Sager, The Incorrigible Constitution, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893, 906 n.39 (1990).
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erences for their substantively correct resolution."11 Certain "require-
ments of justice are judgment-driven, not preference-driven." 12 Here I
agree; but perhaps the Constitution could be better understood as ajudg-
ment-driven but nevertheless majoritarian and populist document. In
Sager's terms, the "ground" of decisionmaking by We the People could
be "judgment-driven" but the "procedure" could be majoritarian. 13 On
this account, the Constitution would command "respect by virtue of its
majoritarian provenance," but should be viewed not as "merely a rather
unusual statute" 14 but rather as (at least at times) a rather unusual de-
claratory judgment. The Constitution would result not-or not al-
ways-from a constitutional "legislature" 15 of We the People, but from
Us as a constitutional "judiciary." It would reflect not merely the
"wishes of past generations" 16 but also their judgments. I am not sure
whether, in Professor Sager's taxonomy, this account is a "positive" one
or a "pragmatic justice" one, or both, or neither. But like the positive
account, this account might open up some space-a gap of sorts-be-
tween the Constitution itself and (government officials' views of) perfect
political justice. 17
The "High Court" account is rather simple. 18 Just as Parliament as
Sovereign in England sits both as the supreme legislature implementing
its will and as the highest court rendering its best judgment about what
natural law and justice command, 19 so in America We the People-as
sovereign successors to Parliament's power-enjoy both supreme legisla-
tive and supreme judicial power. The Constitution and amendments
promulgated by We the People need not always be understood as legisla-
tive enactments, as the product of popular will creating new rights and
duties. Sometimes, various constitutional provisions are better under-
stood as declaratory judgments of We the People as the True High
Court, reflecting not popular will but popular judgment. (This account
in fact describes much of the popular self-understanding underlying the
11 Sager, supra note 1, at 416.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 418.
14 Id. at 415.
15 Id. at 416.
16 Id.
17 My parenthetical in this sentence suggests that just as there are gaps between full justice and
workable, justiciable doctrine for judges, so too there may be "agency cost" gaps between the people
and their imperfect representatives in Congress and state legislatures. Because of these gaps, We the
People might well decide to draft constitutional provisions that constrain even legislators' pursuit of
their own views of political justice.
18 For additional elaboration, see Amar, Bill of Rights II, supra note 7, at 1206-08; Jeff Rosen,
Note, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitutional?, 100 YALE L.J. 1073, 1081-82 (1991).
19 See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 154,
263 (1969); Thomas C. Grey, Origin of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American
Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843, 872 (1978).
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Bill of Rights and the Reconstruction Amendments.) 20 The fact that We
the People as Supreme Court act through majoritarian processes is of
course no embarrassment; the current U.S. Supreme Court also abides by
majority rule (five votes trump four, even if the four are from some exter-
nal perspective "right"), yet no one doubts it is indeed a court.
If this "High Court" account were accepted, then could the gap
Professor Sager seeks to close between the Constitution and perfect polit-
ical justice reopen? On the "High Court" account, the nine Justices are,
in the deepest sense, inferior judges. But-and here's the edge-so too
are members of Congress, the President, and other ordinary government
officials interpreting and applying the Constitution outside adjudication.
Unlike Thayer's and Sager's gap between the interpretive power/role of
the courts on one side, and the political branches on the other, now we
may have a gap between all ordinary government officials (and their
views of perfect political justice) on the one hand, and the Constitution
on the other.
To put the point one final way, perhaps we should switch our im-
plicit observational perch, viewing constitutional interpretation not from
the point of view of the nine Justices, but rather of an inferior federal
judge. If we start with the nine, we must confront the "inertia" of past
Supreme Court decisions; but as Professor Sager notes, "inertia" does not
impede the Supreme Court very much, especially in the long run, given
its freedom to distinguish or overrule old precedent.21 But a lower fed-
eral judge faced with an on point five-four ruling of the U.S. Supreme
Court has considerably less freedom to ignore the judgment of these five,
even if in her view, the four much better approximate perfect political
justice. So contrary precedent from a higher court does indeed open up a
gap. And this gap has little to do with courts versus legislatures and
issues ofjusticiability-the main target of Sager and Thayer. Rather, it is
a gap created because from the point of view of the lower judge, the
higher court "got it wrong"-that is, betrayed the best understanding of
perfect political justice. And if we see the true High Court as We the
People, and various constitutional provisions as declaratory judgments,
might not there be a similar gap between Our judgments-the Constitu-
tion-and the best understanding of political justice held by constitution-
ally inferior tribunals (the nine Justices, Congress, the President, and so
on)?
20 Amar, Bill of Rights I, supra note 7, at 1154 n.109; Amar, Bill of Rights 1, supra note 7, at
1205-60, 1268-72.
21 Sager, supra note 1, at 417.
